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Chapter 11 Reorganizations and Credit Bidding: Why the
Third Circuit Erred in In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC
Joshua Barney*
INTRODUCTION
Rarely does a decision from a bankruptcy court affect anything
outside of the bankruptcy world. The recent Third Circuit decision In
re Philadelphia Newspapers may change that.
The ability of a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession to sell assets free
and clear of liens has been long recognized as one of the most impor-
tant tools for restructuring a debtor's assets and maximizing the
debtor's estate to fund creditor distributions.' However, the secured
creditor is not without protection. A secured creditor whose collateral
is to be sold free and clear is afforded an important right in connection
with the sale of the debtor's assets.
Section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the United States Bankruptcy Code pro-
vides that when a reorganization plan includes a sale of the debtor's
assets, there are three distinct routes the confirmation plan can take. 2
First, under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i), the secured party retains the lien and
receives a deferred cash payment.3 A second route entails a free and
clear sale of assets subject to credit bidding under
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). 4 Finally, a third possibility would give the se-
cured party the "indubitable equivalent" of the secured interest under
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). 5
The ability for a secured creditor to credit bid under subsection (ii)
provides an important protection because if the secured creditor be-
lieves that its collateral will be sold for less than its actual value, the
* B.A. in Political Science, University of Michigan, 2007; J.D. DePaul University College of
Law, 2011. The author would like to thank Timothy Hoffmann and Nicholas Thompson for their
insights and support.
1. Mark G. Douglas, Making the Most of an Undersecured Creditor's Claim: The Nuances of
Credit Bidding in Bankruptcy, 5 RECENT DEV. BANKR. & RESTRUCTURING 3, May - Jun. 2006,
at 1 - 2, available at http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/4a56c9fd-da64-49a8-8bbe-18458c
16cbe3/Presentation/PublicationAttachmente56bb348-1942-4d3e-8ade-186d73ea3f90/JDNYI
2265322_1_creditbiddingMayjune%202006%20BRR.pdf.
2. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (2006).
3. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i).
4. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).
5. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).
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creditor has the option to take the collateral by credit bidding its debt.
In lieu of using cash, credit bidding permits a secured creditor to bid
up to the face value of its loan as consideration for the debtor's as-
sets. 6 For the past thirty years it was generally accepted that
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) was the exclusive method through which a debtor
could cramdown a reorganization plan that included a sale of the
debtor's assets free of liens.
All of this changed in March, 2010 with the Third Circuit's holding
in In re Philadelphia Newspapers that a cramdown provision's "indu-
bitable equivalent" subsection unambiguously excluded lenders' right
to credit bid on all asset sales under § 1129(b)(2)(A). 7 The Philadel-
phia Newspapers decision may have a significant effect on the way
debtors propose reorganization plans under Chapter 11. Secured
lenders rely on their ability to credit bid in extending credit to debtors.
Allowing the possibility of an asset sale free of its liens without a right
to credit bid will force the lender to adjust the way it makes and prices
extensions of credit. Additionally, after Philadelphia Newspapers,
debtors will likely engage in impermissible sub rosa plans that are de-
signed to side step the creditor protections under the Bankruptcy
Code.
This Article contends that Philadelphia Newspapers was wrongly
decided as a matter of law and policy. Section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code compels distinct routes of how a given plan of reor-
ganization proposes to treat the claims of secured creditors.8 It fur-
ther compels that any plan of reorganization that includes a sale of the
debtor's assets free and clear of any liens must allow the secured cred-
itor to credit bid.9
Part I of this note briefly explains the United States Bankruptcy
Code, credit bidding, and the requirements for confirmation of a reor-
ganization plan. Part II discusses the relevant case law before the
Third Circuit's decision in Philadelphia Newspapers and the case itself.
Part III demonstrates why the court's decision in Philadelphia News-
papers will lead to an increase in sub rosa reorganization plans.
I. THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY CODE AND CREDIT BIDDING
This Part briefly explains the Bankruptcy Code, credit bidding, why
credit bidding is an important right for secured creditors, the require-
6. Vincent S.J. Buccola & Ashley C. Keller, Credit Bidding and the Design of Bankruptcy
Auctions, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99 (2010).
7. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 301 (3d Cir. 2010).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A).
9. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).
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ments of a reorganization plan, and the "cramdown" provision under
the Bankruptcy Code.
A. Overview Of The United States Bankruptcy Code
The word "bankrupt" dates back as far as the Roman Empire.' 0
Attorney and author Myles H. Alderman, Jr. explains that during the
time of the Roman Empire, "a merchant who could not pay his obliga-
tions [had] . . . the table . . . from which he had conducted his business
broken. Thus, the word "bankrupt" appears to come from the Latin
word 'bankus' meaning bench and 'ruptus' meaning broken.""
Bankruptcy law also appears in many other cultures, religions, and
geographical locations.12 In Ancient Greece, no bankruptcy laws ex-
isted.' 3 If a man could not pay his debts, he became a slave until the
creditor had recouped its losses. 14 In the Yassa of Genghis Khan, a
man who became bankrupt three times was put to death. 5 Much like
almost every area of American law, modern U.S. bankruptcy law
traces its origin from British law.' 6
1. Creation of Bankruptcy Courts
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution authorizes
Congress to enact "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States."17 Bankruptcy courts are exclusively
federal courts, meaning that even if an individual or corporation
wanted to file for bankruptcy in a state court they could not do so.',
The 1898 Bankruptcy Act gave the District courts the nickname
"courts of bankruptcy."1 9 Section 201 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
10. MYLES H. ALDERMAN, JR., CHAPTER 11 BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS FOR BUSINESS
LEADERS, ACCOUNTANTS, AND LAWYERs 7 (2006).
11. Id. at 7-8.
12. The History of Bankruptcy, STRAIGHTBANKRUFICY.ORG, http://www.straightbankruptcy.
org/history ofjbankruptcy.asp (last visited Apr. 3, 2011).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. A Brief History of Bankruptcy Law, VAULT.COM, http://www.vault.com/articles/A-Brief-
History-Of-Bankruptcy-Law-17926399.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2011).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
18. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts on behalf of the Federal Judiciary, US-
COURTS.Gov, Bankruptcy Cases, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Understandingthe
FederalCourts/HowCourtsWork/BankruptcyCases.aspx (last visited Nov. 2, 2010).
19. ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY T 2.01[1] (16th ed.
Supp. no. 115, 2009).
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of 1978 changed this in 1978 to the United States Bankruptcy Court.20
Modern U.S. bankruptcy law, including Chapter 11 corporate reorga-
nizations, comes from the 1978 Act.21
2. Major Players in a Bankruptcy
Four major players exist in a bankruptcy case. First, there is a
debtor. According to the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor is a "person or
municipality concerning which a case under [the Bankruptcy Code]
has been commenced." 22 A better understanding of what a debtor is
would be someone who owes a debt. 23 The meaning of debt is de-
scribed under the Bankruptcy Code as "liability on a claim." 24 More-
over, the Code defines a "claim" as a right to payment or other
equitable remedy.25 Put together, a debtor is a person or municipality
who owes a liability on a right to payment or other equitable remedy.
Second, the counterparty to a debtor is a creditor, which is a person
or entity having a claim against the debtor.26 A debtor's creditor can
have a secured or unsecured claim against it. A secured creditor is a
creditor "holding a claim against the debtor who has the right to take
and hold or sell certain property of the debtor in satisfaction of some
or all of the claim." 27 While an unsecured creditor is one who holds
"[a] claim or debt for which a creditor holds no special assurance of
payment," 28 where the debt is "[one] for which credit was extended
based solely upon the creditor's assessment of the debtor's future abil-
ity to pay." 29
A third major player in bankruptcy is the United States Trustee,
who is "[a]n officer of the Justice Department responsible for super-
vising the administration of bankruptcy cases, estates, and trustees;
monitoring plans and disclosure statements; monitoring creditors'
committees; monitoring fee applications; and performing other statu-
tory duties."30
20. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) ("(a) There shall be in each judicial district, as an adjunct to the
district court for such district, a bankruptcy court which shall be a court of record known as the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the district.").
21. See VAULT, supra note 16.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) (2006).
23. BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 464 (9th ed. 2009).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12).
25. Id. § 101(5)(a)-(b).
26. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 396 (8th ed. 2004).
27. MARK J. MARKUS, Glossary: Definitions for Common Bankruptcy and Legal Terms, http://
www.bklaw.com/bankruptcy-terms.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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Finally, the other major player in bankruptcy is the debtor-in-pos-
session "that continues to operate its business as a fiduciary to the
bankruptcy estate."3'
3. Purpose of Bankruptcy
In effect, bankruptcy functions to mitigate the effects of financial
failure. 32 The bankruptcy laws seek to accomplish two main goals.
First, the Bankruptcy Code serves to grant a fresh start to the honest
but unfortunate debtor. 33 Second, the Code benefits creditors by
"secur[ing] a prompt and effectual administration and settlement of
the estate of all bankrupts within a limited period . . . ."34
Cases filed under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code
are known as "reorganizations." 3 5 A debtor enters Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy with the goal of creating a plan that will allow the debtor to
reorganize its business, pay off creditors over time, and eventually
reemerge out of bankruptcy as a "new" company. 36 Chapter 11 plans
are based on one or more of three things: a reorganization of the busi-
ness, a sale of the debtor's assets, or a sale of the debtor as a going
concern.37 As part of its reorganization plan, debtors frequently
choose to sell all, or part of, its assets free and clear of any liens. A
sale free of liens is especially attractive for a debtor because it helps to
achieve the maximum possible value for the asset being sold.38 Fur-
thermore, it promotes quick and efficient liquidation by not having to
worry about the validity and competing interests in the asset.39
B. Credit Bidding
Credit bidding protects the secured creditor with a security interest
in the collateral being sold free and clear of the liens attached to it.40
31. BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 464 (9th ed. 2009).
32. See RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 19, 1.01[1].
33. See, e.g., Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 192 (1902) ("The determination of
the status of the honest and unfortunate debtor by his liberation from encumbrance on future
exertion is matter of public concern, and Congress has power to accomplish it throughout the
United States by proceedings at the debtor's domicil.").
34. See RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 19, 1.01[1] (citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323,
328 (1966) (quoting Ex parte City Bank of New Orleans in re William Christy, 44 U.S. 292
(1845))).
35. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts on behalf of the Federal Judiciary, US-
COURTS.Gov, Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code, http://www.uscourts.gov/Federal
Courts/BankruptcylBankruptcyBasics/Chapterll.aspx (last visited Oct. 22, 2011).
36. Id.
37. ALDERMAN, JR., supra note 10, at 9.
38. See Douglas, supra note 1, at 2.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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It allows a secured creditor to bid the amount of debt it has a security
interest in rather than having to bid with cash at a sale of the debtor's
assets.41 A hypothetical is illustrative. A creditor lends a farm equip-
ment dealership $10,000 and has received a security interest in a single
tractor. The dealership enters Chapter 11 bankruptcy and decides
that as part of its plan to reorganize, it is going to sell several of its
tractors free and clear of all the security interests attached to them,
including the one that the creditor has a security interest in. When the
dealership sells that tractor it must give the creditor the money from
the winning bid. Credit bidding is a method for the secured creditor
to ensure that when collateral is sold at a debtor's asset sale it receives
the proper valuation. Since the creditor has a $10,000 security interest
in the tractor it would like the winning bid on the tractor to be at least
$10,000. Since it holds a security interest in the tractor, it can bid any
amount up to the value of its full claim without having to spend any
additional money. If another bidder bids $12,000 on the tractor, the
secured creditor will receive in full the $10,000 it originally loaned to
the debtor. If someone had originally bid $5,000, the secured creditor
would fear that the collateral is being sold for too low a price. In that
case, the secured creditor would still have a $5,000 judgment against
the dealership. If the dealership, however, never emerges from bank-
ruptcy, that money is likely gone and the secured creditor will never
recover the full amount of its loan. Credit bidding would allow the
secured creditor to bid up to $10,000, so that if there were no higher
bid it would then obtain ownership over the tractor.
While courts will allow secured creditors to credit bid in most in-
stances, some criticize credit bidding. Specifically, critics question
"loan-to-own" transactions which are orchestrated by a debtor-in-pos-
session, who is also the secured creditor (often times a hedge fund),42
to purchase the assets of the debtor.43 The terms of the deal are de-
signed in a way that all but ensures that secured creditor is the only
party capable of purchasing the debtor's assets.44 The debtor-in-pos-
session has the ability to dictate how the sale will proceed, including
bidding procedures, timing of the sale, break-up fees and expense re-
imbursements, and the parameters for any challenge to its lien posi-
41. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 320 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., dissenting).
42. Joseph J. Wielebinski & Timothy A. Million, Recurrent and Developing Issues Encoun-
tered in Sales Pursuant to Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, in ST. B. TEX. ADV. Bus. BANKR.
CoNF. 14 (May 2008), available at http://www.munsch.com/files/1610223_1.pdf.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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tion or claim.45 This is a limited scenario, however, and in most
instances, the courts will allow secured creditors to credit bid their
claims.
C. Confirmation of a Reorganization Plan
Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code addresses confirmation of
plans, including those plans that involve a sale of assets. Section
1129(a) precludes courts from confirming plans that do not fulfill all of
the requirements under it.46 Included in Chapter 11 are several pro-
tections for both the debtor and creditors.
1. Chapter 11 Requirements and Protections
When a corporation enters bankruptcy what follows is usually a
lengthy period of tug of war. Congress designed Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code to force the debtor to negotiate with its creditors in
order to formulate a plan of reorganization that will transform it into
a more financially successful corporation. 47 This reorganization re-
quires extensive negotiations between the debtor and its creditors.
a. Automatic Stay
To initially protect the debtor, the Bankruptcy Code grants it an
automatic stay, which freezes all lawsuits against it48 and all actions
against its property,49 with a limited number of exceptions.50 The au-
tomatic stay is a designed timeout with an aim to force debtors and
creditors to negotiate a confirmable reorganization plan.5
b. Good Faith Requirement
To aid their position in negotiations, the Bankruptcy Code affords
protections for creditors as well. A court can confirm a reorganization
plan only when it follows the "good faith requirement" under
45. Resolved: Loan-to-Own DIP Lenders Should Not Be Allowed to Credit Bid, 041207 AM.
BANKR. INST. 85 (Apr. 2007).
46. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (2006) ("The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following
requirements are met . . . .").
47. Craig A. Sloane, The Sub Rosa Plan of Reorganization: Side-Stepping Creditor Protections
in Chapter 11, 16 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 37, 40 (1999).
48. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 362(b).
51. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts on behalf of the Federal Judiciary, Reorganiza-
tion Under the Bankruptcy Code, USCOURTS.Gov, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bank
ruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapterll.aspx (last visited Oct. 22, 2011).
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§ 1129(a)(3).52 A plan meets the "good faith" requirement when
"there is a reasonable likelihood that the plan will achieve a result
consistent with the objectives and purposes of the Code."53 A court
will look to include a few factors: the circumstances surrounding the
plan,54 whether the plan was proposed with good intentions,55 whether
there is a reasonable basis to believe that the plan will result in a suc-
cessful reorganization of the debtor,56 and whether there is fundamen-
tal fairness regarding the treatment of the creditors.57
c. The Absolute Priority Rule
The reorganization plan must satisfy the "absolute priority rule."
This rule holds that all dissenting creditors must be paid in full58 and
that no one with a claim or interest that is junior to the claims of the
dissenting creditor will get or retain anything under the plan.59 The
absolute priority rule establishes the pecking order for the creditors in
bankruptcy. For instance, if debtor X has ten creditor classes, class
ten cannot receive any money until classes one through nine have re-
ceived the full value of their claims.
d. Best Interest of the Creditors Test
The reorganization plan must be in the "best interest" of the credi-
tors under § 1129(a)(7). 60 However, this test only applies to those
creditors impaired under the plan.61 Judges Ginsberg and Martin ex-
plain that best interest is a term of art under the Bankruptcy Code
meaning "creditors and equity security holders are no worse off under
the plan of financial rehabilitation for the debtor than they could be in
a Chapter 7 liquidation of the debtor's assets."62 A bankruptcy court
cannot approve a plan that would distribute to creditors less than what
52. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3).
53. McCormick v. Banc One Leasing Corp (In re McCormick), 49 F.3d 1524, 1526 (11th Cir.
1995).
54. Chapter 11 Plans: Good Faith Requirement, LAWYERS.COM, http://bankruptcy.lawyers.
com/commercial-bankruptcy/Bankruptcy-Chapter-11-Plans-Good-Faith-Requirement.htmi (last
visited Oct. 22, 2011).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006).
59. See id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
60. Id. § 1129(a)(7).
61. Impaired Creditors and Your Chapter 11 Plan, LAWYERS.COM, http://bankruptcy.lawyers.
com/commercial-bankruptcy/Impaired-Creditors-and-Your-Chapter-11-Plan.html (last visited
Oct. 22, 2011).
62. ROBERT E. GINSBERG ET AL., GINSBERG & MARTIN ON BANKRUPTCY 13-78 (Aspen, 4th
ed. 2007).
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they would receive if the corporation had liquidated and disposed of
the proceeds.
e. Feasibility Requirement
Section 1129(a)(11) requires that "[c]onfirmation of the plan is not
likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further finan-
cial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under
the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the
plan."63 The goal of the feasibility requirement is to prevent future
and successive bankruptcy filings." This makes sense, because when a
debtor emerges from bankruptcy all of its debt is eliminated except
for whatever is left in the reorganization plan. 6 5
f. The Right of Impaired Creditors to Vote on the Plan
All creditors that receive their fully secured amount are not im-
paired and are deemed to have accepted the plan.6 6 An impaired
creditor is one that receives less than it is owed.67 Moreover, if a class
of creditors receives nothing under the plan, that class is presumed to
reject it.68 There are two requirements that must be satisfied before
each creditor class can accept the reorganization plan. First, a major-
ity (fifty-one percent or more) of the number of creditors within each
group must approve the plan. 6 9 Second, the majority of members of
the class that have approved the plan must hold two-thirds of all the
claims within that class.70
However, the debtor can "cramdown" the plan over the objections
of an impaired class by satisfying the requirements of § 1129(b). 71
Only one class of impaired creditors has to accept the plan for the
debtor to try the cramdown provision under the Bankruptcy Code. 72
Paramount to the cramdown provision under § 1129 is that "the plan
does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect
to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not
accepted, the plan."73 The requirements for what is "fair and equita-
63. Sloane, supra note 47, at 44.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Impaired Creditors and Your Chapter 11 Plan, supra note 61.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2006).
72. Impaired Creditors and Your Chapter 11 Plan, supra note 61.
73. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1)(A).
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ble" for secured claims are stated in subsection (b)(2)(A).7 4 Subsec-
tion (b)(2)(A)(i) provides an unattractive option because a party will
not likely want to purchase assets with liens attached. Thus, most
claims that include a sale of the debtor's assets are sold without liens
and fall with in subsection (ii).
Finally, a third possibility is found in § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii), where a
debtor can satisfy the "fair and equitable" requirement by providing
the creditor with the "indubitable equivalent" of its secured claim.75
The term "indubitable equivalent" originates from In re Murel Hold-
ing Corp.,76 where Judge Learned Hand opined that "a secured credi-
tor could not be deprived of his collateral 'unless by a substitute of the
most indubitable equivalence.'" Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) is infre-
quently invoked because most plans of reorganization fall under ei-
ther § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) or (ii).78 The major question that arises when
a debtor decides to conduct an asset sale as part of its plan of reorgan-
ization is whether § 1129(b)(2)(A) permits the debtor to sell the assets
free and clear of any liens under subsection (iii) without allowing se-
cured lenders the ability to credit bid.
74. Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) provides in full:
(A) With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides-
(i) (I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such claims, whether
the property subject to such liens is retained by the debtor or transferred to another
entity, to the extent of the allowed amount of such claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of such claim de-
ferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as
of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder's interest in the
estate's interest in such property;
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property that is subject to
the liens securing such claims, free and clear of such liens, with such liens to attach to
the proceeds of such sale, and the treatment of such liens on proceeds under clause (i)
or (iii) of this subparagraph; or
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent of such claims.
Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iii).
75. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).
76. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 310 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing In re Murel Holding
Corp., 75 F.2d. 941 (2d Cir. 1935)).
77. Id.
78. Id.
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II. IN RE PHILADELPHIA NEWSPAPERS: So LONG AS A PLAN
UNDER SECTION 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) PROVIDES SECURED LENDERS
WITH THE "INDUBITABLE EQUIVALENT" OF THEIR SECURED
INTEREST IN THE ASSETS, IT NEED NOT GIVE A SECURED
CREDITOR THE RIirr TO CREDIT BID
First, this Part sets out an important case before Philadelphia News-
papers. Then, it goes through Philadelphia Newspapers' facts, issues,
and procedural history. Next, it examines the Third Circuit's analysis
and reasoning, focusing on the statutory language of § 1129(b)(2)(A).
Finally, it examines in depth the dissenting opinion.
A. In re Pacific Lumber Co.
In In re Pacific Lumber, six affiliated debtors were involved in
growing, harvesting, and processing redwood timber in Humboldt
County, California.79 The case involved the reorganization of two of
the debtors: Pacific Lumber Company (Palco) and Scotia Pacific, LLC
(Scopac).80 Marathon Structured Finance (Marathon) held a $160
million secured interest in Palco's assets.8 1 Palco's assets consisted of
a saw mill, a power plant, and the company town of Scotia, California,
but were only valued at $110 million at the date of the bankruptcy
filing. 2 Scopac, a special purpose entity wholly owned by Palco, had
assets comprised of 200,000 acres of prime redwood timberland in
California.83 Scopac, however, owed heavy debts to certain notehold-
ers in the approximate amount of $780 million, which was secured by
the timberlands and Scopac's other assets.84 Scopac owed another
$36.2 million to Bank of America on a secured line of credit.85
Pursuant to § 1121(b), a debtor has 120 days to file a reorganization
plan before any creditor can file its own reorganization plan for the
debtor.86 The bankruptcy court may, and often does, extend this ex-
clusivity period beyond 120 days and up to 18 months.87 In Pacific
Lumber, over a year had gone by without any progress toward a con-
firmable reorganization before the court terminated the debtors' ex-
clusivity period.88 The court then allowed the filing of five competing
79. In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009).
80. Id. at 236.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 237.
85. Id.
86. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2006).
87. Id. § 1121(d)(2)(A).
88. In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 247.
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proposed plans.89 Of those five proposed plans only the Marathon-
proposed plan was deemed confirmable by the court.90 A central is-
sue in the case was the value of Scopac's redwood timberland that
secured the noteholders' claims.' After hearing testimony, the court
determined that the timberland was valued at "no more than $510
million" and that $510 million was the "indubitable equivalent" to the
noteholders secured interests. 92
The noteholders objected, arguing that Marathon's proposed plan
was not "fair and equitable" because the plan sold the timberlands
without providing the noteholders a right to credit bid.93 They also
objected to the court's valuation of Scopac's assets, asserting that they
could prove they were worth $740 if the court allowed them to credit
bid. 9 4 The bankruptcy court rejected their argument and confirmed
the reorganization plan shortly after.95
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2), the noteholders appealed di-
rectly to the Fifth Circuit. 96 Focusing on the statutory language of
§ 1129(b), the Fifth Circuit rejected the noteholders' arguments and
affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. 97 The court noted the three
subsections of § 1129(b)(2)(a) are separated by the disjunctive, "or"
and not "and."98 The court emphasized the importance of this con-
struction. The debtor was free to choose which of the three subsec-
tions it wanted to satisfy. By receiving a cash payment equal to the
value of their secured claims, the court concluded that the noteholders
had received the "indubitable equivalent" or their secured claims in
satisfaction of § 1129(b)(2)(a)(iii). 99
B. In re Philadelphia Newspapers' Facts and Procedural History
In 2006, Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC (the Debtors) bought the
Philadelphia Inquirer, Philadelphia Daily News, and the online publi-
cation www.philly.com for $515 million.100 $295 million of the
purchase price came from a collection of lenders (the Lenders). 101
89. Id. at 249.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 238.
92. Id.
93. In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 239.
94. Id. at 237.
95. Id. at 239.
96. Id. at 239, n.13.
97. Id. at 236.
98. In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 245.
99. Id. at 249.
100. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 301 (3d Cir. 2010).
101. Id.
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The Loan Agreement and other loan documents gave the Lenders a
first priority lien on substantially all of the Debtors' real and personal
property.102 By September 2008, the Debtors had defaulted on cove-
nants in the Loan Agreement and on loan payments. 03
In August, 2009, the Debtors filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code.104 The Debtors' Chapter 11 reorganization
plan (the Plan) provided for a sale of all or substantially all of the
Debtors' assets free and clear of liens to a "Stalking Horse."105 A
Stalking Horse is a term used to describe the initial bid on a bankrupt
company's assets from an interested buyer.106 The Plan was expected
to generate approximately $37 million in cash for the Lenders. 07 It
also provided that the Lenders would receive the Debtors' Philadel-
phia headquarters, valued at $29.5 million. 08 The headquarters, how-
ever, would be subject to a two-year rent-free lease for the entity that
would operate the newspapers, i.e. not the Lenders. 0 9 In sum, the
Plan contemplated a distribution to the Lenders of approximately $66
million when the Lenders were owed, after adjustment, approximately
$318 million. 120 The Debtors intended to market the proposed deal in
an effort to solicit a higher bid.11' On August 28, 2009, the Debtors
filed a motion for approval of bid procedures. 112 As part of the mo-
tion, the Debtors insisted that any qualified bidder fund its purchase
offer with cash, precluding the Lenders from credit bidding for the
assets.13
The Lenders objected, arguing that the applicable law maintained a
right to credit bid. Since the plan was conducted under § 1123(a) and
(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and not § 363, the Debtors contended
that there was no expressed guarantee for the Lenders to credit bid.114
Further, the Debtors argued that § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) required only
that a debtor provide a secured creditor the "indubitable equivalent"
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 301.
106. Stalking-Horse Bid, INVESTOPEDIA ULC, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/stalking
horsebid.asp (last visited Oct. 22, 2011).
107. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d at 302.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 2009 WL 3242292, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 2009),
rev'd in part, 418 B.R. 548 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
111. Id.
112. In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 302.
113. Id.
114. In re Phila. Newspapers, 2009 WL 3242292, at *2-4.
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of their secured interest in the debtor's assets and not a guaranteed
right to credit bid."i5 Finally, the Debtors argued that as a matter of
public policy, the Lenders should be precluded from the right to credit
bid.116 The Debtors argued that credit bidding by the Lenders would
chill competitive bidding, since other bidders would be scared off be-
cause the Lenders' claim would vastly exceed the fair market value of
the Debtors' assets."17
C. The Bankruptcy Court's Decision
On October 8, 2009, the bankruptcy court rejected the Debtors' ar-
guments and issued an order refusing to bar the Lenders from credit
bidding."18 First, the court rejected the proposition that, although
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) specifies three alternatives and the Debtors had pro-
ceeded under subsection (iii), it was, in reality, structured as a
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) plan in every respect other than credit bidding.119
The court was critical of the Debtors' "thinly veiled attempt to manip-
ulate the sale process in order to frustrate a credit bid which the Debt-
ors anticipate will exceed the bid of the Stalking Horse."120 The court
similarly rejected the Debtors' argument that while § 1129(b)(2)(A)
(ii) mentions a right to credit bid, this right is limited to sales under
§ 363(b).121 The Debtors argued that because § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) ref-
erences sales "subject to section 363(k)," and because § 363(k) makes
reference to a sale under § 363(b), the right to credit bid was limited
to a sale under § 363(b) only.12 2 The court disagreed with this argu-
ment because in its mind another logical conclusion was that
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) was simply importing the essence of § 363(k) into
the cramdown section, because if the legislative intent was to limit
credit bidding to § 363(b), the reference would have been to § 363(b)
and not § 363(k).123 Since the language of the statute was susceptible
of more than one reasonable interpretation, the court held that the
strict language of the statute could not control and that the court
would look to other courts that had considered the question at
hand.124 The court found that the clear weight of authority supports
115. Id.
116. Id. at *4.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. In re Phila. Newspapers, 2009 WL 3242292, at *5.
120. Id.
121. Id. at *6.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. In re Phila. Newspapers, 2009 WL 3242292, at *6.
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the Lenders and rejected the Debtors' contention that it could deny
the Lenders the ability to credit bid.125
D. The Third Circuit's Analysis and Reasoning in In re
Philadelphia Newspapers
1. Statutory Language
Like the bankruptcy court, the Third Circuit focused on the statu-
tory language of § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). Unlike the bankruptcy court,
however, the Third Circuit found the section to be entirely clear and
free of ambiguity. The court focused its attention on the disjunctive
"or" that separates the three subsections of § 1129(b)(2)(A). 126 Since
the statute contained an "or" and not an "and" the court reasoned,
and the Lenders conceded, that a debtor need only satisfy one of the
subsections.127 The Lenders, however, argued the proposed treatment
of collateral determined which of the § 1129(b)(2)(A) subsections was
applicable. 128 The court summarized the Lenders' argument as
any Chapter 11 plan proposing the transfer of assets encumbered by
their original liens must proceed under subsection (i), any plan pro-
posing the free and clear sale of assets must proceed under subsec-
tion (ii), and only those plans proposing a disposition not covered
by subsections (i) and (ii), most notably the substitution of collat-
eral, may then proceed under subsection (iii). This reasoning dic-
tates that, because the Plan includes a sale of collateral free and
clear of liens, the Lenders would have a statutory right to credit bid
pursuant to the express terms of subsection (ii).12 9
The court rejected this argument and followed the Fifth Circuit's hold-
ing in Pacific Lumber.130 Following the reasoning from Pacific Lum-
ber, the court emphasized fairness to creditors over the cramdown
structure.131 By doing so, it deemed that Congress's use of the word
"or" in § 1129(b)(2)(A) served a specific purpose.132 Under the bank-
ruptcy court's ruling a reorganization plan with a free and clear sale
that did not include the ability for the lender to credit bid would fail
even if it fully compensated lenders for their secured interest. 33 The
court concluded that the statutory language of § 1129(b)(2)(A) is un-
ambiguous: As long as a reorganization plan that calls for sale of as-
125. Id. at *6-10.
126. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 305 (3d Cir. 2010).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 306.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 306.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 301-10.
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sets free and clear of any liens provides lenders with the "indubitable
equivalent" of their secured interest, it meets the "fair and equitable"
requirement of § 1129(b)(1) and there is no statutory right for the
lenders to credit bid their secured interests.134
2. The "Indubitable Equivalent" Language of § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii)
The court next examined the precise language of
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).1 35 Even though the court held that the term was
broad, it stated that the phrase was not unclear and that "indubitable
equivalent" under subsection (iii) is "the unquestionable value of a
lender's secured interest in the collateral."136 The Lenders had tried
to argue that without the ability to credit bid they could never receive
the "indubitable equivalent" of their secured interest, but the court
disagreed.'37 It was not the sale of assets itself that needed to gener-
ate the "indubitable equivalent," the court explained, it was the reor-
ganization plan itself.138 Since the auction had not occurred the court
insisted that it was not in a position to conclude that the auction would
provide the Lenders with less than the "indubitable equivalent" of
their secured interest; there could be other bidders that chose to sub-
mit cash bids for the assets.139
E. The Dissent
1. Section 1129(b)(2)(A) is Ambiguous
Judge Ambro first contended that § 1129(b)(2)(A) has more than
one plausible explanation and noted that both the district and bank-
ruptcy courts and reached different interpretations.' 40 After briefly
reiterating the majority's holding Judge Ambro went to work poking
holes in its analysis. First, he attacked the majority's reliance on
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)'s use of the word "or." Citing numerous other sec-
tions of the Bankruptcy Code, Judge Ambro argued that the party
that puts forth the reorganization cannot simply choose which of the
three subsections it wishes to satisfy, but that "Congress [listed subsec-
tions (i), (ii), and (iii)] ... as distinct routes that apply specific require-
134. Id. at 310.
135. Id.
136. In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 310.
137. Id. at 311-12.
138. Id. at 312.
139. Id. at 313.
140. Id. at 322 (Ambro, J. dissenting).
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ments depending on how a given plan proposes to treat the claims of
secured creditors."14 1
Congress would have been wasting its time, Judge Ambro wrote, to
allow the three subsections as three different ways to satisfy the "fair
and equitable" requirements of the Bankruptcy Code.142 Contrary to
the majority, Judge Ambro sees subsection (iii) as a "catch-all" provi-
sion, one that addresses those situations that are not already ad-
dressed in the "prior, specifically worded clauses."14 3 Judge Ambro
argued that what the majority has done is place subsections (ii) and
(iii) in conflict with each other.144 Clause (ii) requires that a sale free
of liens mandates a right to credit bid, while the majority held that
clause (iii) allows a sale free of liens without the right to credit bid.145
Citing to the Supreme Court's decision in TRW Inc. v. Adelaide An-
drews, Judge Ambro explained that a "'cardinal principle of statutory
interpretation' is that no provision 'shall be superfluous, void, or insig-
nificant."' 146 Because a debtor can elect to treat the same sale one of
two ways, Judge Ambro argued that the majority has essentially ren-
dered clause (ii) superfluous.147 Under the majority holding, a debtor
will never have to satisfy subsection (ii) if it elects to sell its assets
under an reorganization plan free of liens, so long as it provides the
secured creditor with the indubitable equivalent of its secured
interest.
Finally, Judge Ambro examined the legislative history of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. He noted that § 1129(b) was new to bankruptcy law
when the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978.148 When Congress
enacted this section it deemed it "self-explanatory," in that anytime a
plan proposes to sell the debtor's assets, it would need to provide for
credit bidding.149 Furthermore, each example of how a court could
confirm a plan under clause (iii) fails to state that a sale of collateral
free and clear of liens can be accomplished through clause (iii).15o
Thus, Judge Ambro contends that the majority's holding is inconsis-
tent with the legislative history of § 1129(b).
141. In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 325.
142. Id. at 329.
143. Id.
144. Id. (Ambro, J. dissenting).
145. Id. at 330.
146. In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 330 (citing TRW Inc. v. Adelaide Andrews, 534 U.S.
19, 31 (2001)).
147. In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 330.
148. Id. at 335.
149. Id. at 336. (Ambro, J. dissenting).
150. Id.
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2. Public Policy
Judge Ambro argued that the majority's holding will have a
profound effect on the cost of business. When a secured creditor ex-
tends money to a debtor, it does so with the anticipation that it will
have the ability to credit bid should an auction of the debtor's prop-
erty occur. 151 The ability to credit bid, Judge Ambro explains, allows
the creditor to reduce its costs when extending credit.152 Credit bid-
ding is crucial for the secured party because it "lowers the cost of
lending transactions not only by increasing the strength of the lender's
legal right to force the borrower to pay, but also . .. by limiting the
borrower's ability to engage in conduct that lessens the likelihood of
repayment." 5 3 Judge Ambro further explained that without the abil-
ity to credit bid, the chances of the lenders receiving full value for
their extension of credit is significantly diminished, because a party
that comes to the auction with cash has the very real possibility to
walk away with the debtor's assets at a significantly reduced price.154
Judge Ambro further opines that because of the majority's holding,
future creditors will be forced to adjust the way they set their prices
for extending credit. Because of this, borrowers will likely face a re-
duction in the amount of credit available for borrowing and the cost of
the credit that is available is likely to rise significantly. 55
III. IN RE PHILADELPHIA NEWSPAPERS WILL LEAD TO AN
INCREASE IN SUB ROSA REORGANIZATION PLANS
This Part explains and illustrates an illegal sub-rosa reorganization
plan and explains why they will likely become more common after
Philadelphia Newspapers.
A. What is a sub rosa Reorganization Plan?
Sub rosa is a Latin term that literally means "under the rose."156 It
is something that is confidential and not for publication. 57 The term
comes from the ancient association of roses and confidentiality, which
originally started when Cupid gave Harpocrates, the god of silence, a
151. Id. at 337.
152. In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 337.
153. Id. at 337 (quoting Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 625, 683 (1997)).
154. In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 337 (Arnbro, J. dissenting).
155. Id.
156. BLACK'S LAw DicrIONARY 1564 (9th ed. 2009).
157. Id.
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rose to bribe him not to betray the confidence of Venus.158 In bank-
ruptcy context, a sub rosa plan is "a transaction or agreement that
allegedly sidesteps the protections of the reorganization process as
those protections are embodied in the plan confirmation process." 159
The best way to understand what exactly constitutes a sub rosa plan is
to see one through a case analysis. The following cases describe and
explain what it is the court looks for in determining whether a
debtor's reorganization plan constitutes an illegal sub rosa plan. If the
court finds that a plan is in fact a sub rosa plan it will not confirm it.
B. Origins of the sub rosa Plan
1. The Braniff Case
In the early 1980s Braniff Airways, Inc. filed for Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy with its management staying on as debtor-in-possession.160 As
part of its reorganization Braniff planned to sell essentially all of its
assets under § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, including airplanes, termi-
nal leases, and landing slots to Pacific Southwest Airlines in exchange
for travel scrip, unsecured notes, and profit sharing in the new air-
line.161 This sale was termed the PSA transaction and the agreement
was known as the PSA Agreement.162 The PSA Agreement provided
that only former Braniff employees, shareholders, and a limited num-
ber of unsecured creditors could use the scrip.163 The Agreement fur-
ther required all secured creditors to approve any future
reorganization plan approved of by the unsecured creditors commit-
tee. 1 6 4 Finally, the Agreement required all parties to release all claims
against Braniff, its officers, directors, and secured creditors.165 The
Agreement was a thinly veiled attempt to dictate the terms of any
future reorganization plan.166 Dictating the terms of a future reorgan-
ization plan, limiting creditor voting, and altering creditors' rights
would be the three main factors future courts would look to when
analyzing asset sales challenged as impermissible sub rosa plans.
Reversing the district court's approval of the transaction, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this sale as impermissible under
158. Sub Rosa, DIrIONARY.COM, www.dictionary.reference.com/wordoftheday/archive/2003/
02/17.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2011).
159. Sloan, supra note 47, at 40.
160. In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1983).
161. Id. at 939.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 939-40.
164. Id. at 940.
165. In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d at 940.
166. Id. at 939-940.
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§ 363(b) of the Code.167 Missing from this transaction, the court ex-
plained, were the protections provided to creditors under the Code,
including disclosure, voting, absolute priority, etc.16 8
2. The Continental Case
A sub rosa plan, this time a lease agreement, was again challenged
in the Fifth Circuit in In re Continental Air Lines, Inc.169 In the Fall of
1983 Continental Airlines, Inc. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 70
Continental sought authority from the bankruptcy court to enter into
lease agreements for two of its aircraft.171 By doing so, Continental
argued the leases would increase profitability in its Pacific routes, one
of its most valuable assets.172
Similar to the challenge in Braniff, the institutional creditors chal-
lenged these leases as creeping plans of reorganization that side-
stepped Chapter 11 protections, and thus, were unconfirmable under
Braniff.'73 Unlike in Braniff, however, the district court found that
the debtor had an adequate business justification for entering into the
lease agreements even though they had not been put to a creditor
vote.174 Furthermore, the "proposed leases did not 'dictate the terms
of any future plan of reorganization, nor [would they] leave [Conti-
nental] with so few assets that reorganization [would become] un-
likely.' The leases did not have restrictions 'on voting or any
requirement for release of claims and [would] not alter any creditor's
priority.'"175
C. How In re Philadelphia Newspapers Will Lead to an Increase of
Impermissible sub rosa Reorganization Plans
The typical sub rosa plan is an asset sale under § 363 of the Code.
By selling assets away from the reorganization plan under Chapter 11,
the debtor is able to side step many creditor protections under the
Code. Philadelphia Newspapers disguises a new way to side step cred-
itor protections as a legitimate reorganization.
As previously mentioned, a bankruptcy court uses three factors
from Braniff when analyzing a potential sub rosa plan. First, does the
167. Id. at 94.
168. Id.
169. 780 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1986).
170. Id. at 1224.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1224-25.
173. Id. at 1227.
174. In re Cont'1 Air Lines, Inc., 780 F.2d 1223, 1227 (5th Cir. 1986).
175. Id. at 1225 (quoting In re Con'1 Air Lines, Inc. 61 B.R. 758 (S.D. Tex. 1986)).
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proposed sale or lease dictate the terms of any future reorganization
plan? Had the proposed sale in Philadelphia Newspapers been con-
ducted under § 363(b) of the Code, it clearly would dictate the terms
of any future reorganization plan since the debtor planned to auction
off substantially all of its assets.
Second, does the proposed plan limit creditor voting? As previ-
ously mentioned in Part D of this Article, creditors that receive their
fully secured amount are not impaired and are deemed to have ac-
cepted the plan. The lenders in Philadelphia Newspapers did not re-
ceive their fully secured amount. In Philadelphia Newspapers, the
Third Circuit determined that the debtors' plan satisfied the "indubi-
table equivalent" test of § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii), thus precluding the
creditors the ability to vote on the plan. The interests of the creditors
are better served by credit bidding because more bidders would likely
have increased the going price of the debtor's assets.176
Finally, a court will look to whether a creditor's rights have been
altered. The lenders in Philadelphia Newspapers were collectively
owed approximately $318 million at the time of the bankruptcy peti-
tion. Under the debtors' plan the lenders would receive the debtors'
building, valued at $30 million, but subject to a two-year lease, and the
cash proceeds of the planned auction of the rest of the debtors' assets,
valued at $36 million for a total of $66 million. Since the assets were
being sold "free and clear" of any liens the lenders' right would be
altered by losing out on the remaining $252 million owed to them.
Even if it fails the three Braniff factors a court may approve a sale
or lease that it finds has a legitimate business purpose. Unfortunately
for the debtors in Philadelphia Newspapers, the games they were try-
ing to play did not go unnoticed. Although a primary goal of bank-
ruptcy is to maximize a debtor's estate, the debtors' motivation in
Philadelphia Newspapers seemed to be just the opposite. Judge Am-
bro, much like the bankruptcy court, highlighted some facts from the
case the he found motivated the debtors' attempt to deny the lenders'
ability to credit bid.'77 He explained that this was not an arm's length
deal for several reasons. First, the favored Stalking Horse Bidder was
largely comprised of the debtors' current and former management and
equity holders.178 Second, as part of the reorganization plan, the lend-
ers would receive a building with a two-year rent-free lease to the
176. Vincent S.J. Buccola & Ashley C. Keller, Credit Bidding and the Design of Bankruptcy
Auctions, 18 GEO. MAsok L. REv. 99, 102-04 (2010).
177. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC 599 F.3d 298, 319 (Ambro, J. dissenting).
178. Id.
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Stalking Horse Bidder.179 Finally, the bankruptcy court has noted that
it could "discern no plausible business justification for the restriction
[on credit bidding] which debtors [sought] to include in the Bid Proce-
dures."180 Judge Ambro explained that by denying the lenders' the
ability to credit bid, the Stalking Horse Bidder was attempting to ac-
quire the assets "on the cheap."' 8' When an insider is a potential
buyer of the debtor's assets, there exists too much temptation for it to
sell low to itself. Credit bidding helps to ensure that the debtor is
receiving maximum value for its assets.
What the Philadelphia Newspapers court did was to confirm an im-
permissible sub rosa plan. Now that secured creditors have no guar-
anteed right to credit bid, debtors whose management wishes to buy
its assets can structure reorganization plans that include asset sales.
Unless the secured creditor is willing to spend more money or obtain
an extension of credit from a third party, the pool of potential buyers
may be limited to only the debtor's management team. In this case,
the management team is likely to be the highest bidder and is also
likely to obtain the assets at a price substantially below fair market
value.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States Bankruptcy Code affords numerous protections
to creditors. These protections should not be subverted through
impermissible sub rosa reorganization plans. However, the Third
Circuit's decision in Philadelphia Newspapers is likely to lead
to an increase in sub rosa plans through assets sales under
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). So long as a debtor can convince a bankruptcy
court that it is providing a creditor with the "indubitable equivalent"
of its secured claim, it can sell its assets to an insider for pennies on
the dollar. Creditors will now have to change their pricing for ex-
tending credit now that they cannot maximize a debtor's assets in a
sale by credit bidding. Judge Ambro's view that credit bidding should
be available whenever there is to be a sale of assets in bankruptcy is
more plausible. This way, no statutory provisions or creditor protec-
tions are rendered meaningless.
179. Id. at 320.
180. Id. (quoting In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 2009 WL 3242292, at *10 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
Oct. 8, 2009)).
181. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d at 320.
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